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Genetic Test Results and the Duty to Disclose:
Can Medical Researchers Control Liability?
Richard L. Furman, Jr.*
Increased knowledge of heredity means increased power of con-
trol over the living thing, and as we come to understand more
and more the architecture of the plant or animal we realize what
can and what cannot be done towards modification or improve-
ment....
It is not, however, in the economic field, important as this may
be, that Mendel's discovery is likely to have most meaning for
us: rather it is in the new light in which man will come to view
himself and his fellow creatures .... The little that we know
today offers the hope of a great extension in our knowledge at no
very distant time. If this hope is borne out.., and if also man
decides that his life shall be ordered in the light of this knowl-
edge, it is obvious that the social system will have to undergo
considerable changes.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, medical clinicians and researchers use human genes
to identify and predict specific traits that are inherited from parents
and passed on to children. As ninety-nine percent of human beings'
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DNA molecules are identical, each person shares with every other
more biological similarities than differences. Our individuality or per-
sonal genetic past and future resides in that one percent of our DNA
molecules that is unique.2 Thus, a genetic test is a way to learn about
oneself. Reliable genetic tests for inherited diseases have made the
early detection and treatment of inherited diseases possible.' For
example, prenatal and perinatal genetic screening aids parents in mak-
ing reproductive decisions.4  Today, physicians routinely screen
fetuses and nearly four million newborns for known genetic defects.'
Prenatal genetic screening also gives parents an opportunity to choose
the characteristics of their child. Collecting and storing blood from
the umbilical cord allows doctors to establish the health of the new-
born, to perform autologous blood transfusions in premature infants,
and, most recently, to perform hematopoietic stem cell transplants in
newborns with abnormal bone marrow stem cells.6
Yet, not all genetic test results bring good news. Although your
physician may have the means to diagnose your genetic conditions, he
or she may not be able to offer an effective treatment. As a result,
many people at risk for a genetic disorder choose not to undergo
genetic testing.7
2. Id.
3. Law enforcement officials have also benefited from the development of reliable genetic
tests. "The DNA Proficiency Act of 1995 authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
to establish a national index of DNA... profiles." This project, known as the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS), was completed in September 1998 and consists of four files of DNA
records: a population file, a forensic file, a convicted offender file, and a missing persons file.
John W. Hicks, The Use and Development of DNA Databanks in Law Enforcement, in STORED
TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 305 (Robert F.
Weir ed., 1998). Recently, the New York City police commissioner proposed to help solve
crimes and reduce the number of repeat offenders by collecting DNA samples along with finger-
prints on every person arrested. DNA Tests Sought with Every Arrest, SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Dec. 15, 1998, at A13.
4. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 175-76
(1991).
5. M. Therese Lysaught et al., A Pilot Test of DNA-based Analysis Using Anonymized New-
born Screening Cards in Iowa, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 3 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998). For example, individual states operate
newborn screening programs that typically screen for any of eleven genetic conditions: biotini-
dase deficiency, branched chain ketoacidemia, congenital adrenal hyperplasia, congenital hypo-
thyroidism, cystic fibrosis, galactosemia, hemoglobinopathies, homocystinuria, phenylketonuria,
toxoplasmosis, and tyrosinemia. Id.
6. Dorothy E. Vawter, An Ethical and Policy Framework for the Collection of Umbilical Cord
Blood Stem Cells, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 32, 33 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998). As recently as Spring 1997, cord blood for
about ten thousand infants has been banked for private and community use. Id.
7. For example, less than 14% of the people at risk for Huntington's disease choose to be
tested for the disease. "As medical research unlocks the secrets of genetics, the battle over who
can have access to your personal life story is just getting under way in courts and legislatures."
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The value of genetic information in predicting the present and
future health of specific individuals has not gone unnoticed by third
parties. Today, insurers, employers, schools, the military, courts, and
families often request access to an individual's genetic test results.8
The debate over who should have access to genetic information inten-
sifies as the list of genetically identifiable and potentially harmful dis-
eases and traits continues to grow. Courts and legislatures are now in
the center of this controversy.
This Comment examines research on the human genome and
explores the existence of a duty to disclose genetic test results in clini-
cal and research settings. Part II begins with a hypothetical describing
how such a duty to disclose can arise. Part III (A-C) describes
advances in the sequencing of the human genome, the development of
reliable tests for genetic disorders, and issues regarding access and
control of genetic test samples and results. Part III (D) looks at the
tort law basis for a general duty of physicians to disclose medical
information, the specific duty of clinical physicians to disclose the
presence of genetic disease, and the specific duty of the nonphysician
medical researcher to disclose genetic test results. Part III (E) explores
justification based on a tort-contract hybrid for an expectation inter-
est, on the part of a research subject and a third party, in the disclo-
sure of genetic test results, as defined by informed consent. Part III
(F) examines a tort-contract-property hybrid basis for invoking an
affirmative duty to disclose genetic test results that combines a negli-
gence standard of tort law with a tort-contract based duty of informed
consent to form an individual property interest in genetic information.
This Comment concludes that whether a duty to disclose genetic
test results exists depends on whether the court recognizes the plain-
tiff's claim as based in tort, contract, or property. If the court recog-
nizes the claim as based in tort, then the status of the researcher will
determine whether a special relationship exists. If the court recognizes
the claim as based in tort-contract, then the status of the sample,
informed consent, and the subject's expectation interest will determine
the existence and scope of a duty to disclose. If the court bases the
claim on the property right of the research subject in his or her genetic
information, the court's analysis will be a hybrid of negligence and
contract law that emphasizes the recognized property interest in
informed consent. As a result, medical researchers may best protect
themselves from liability surrounding the duty to disclose genetic test
results by making the principal investigator a nonphysician and care-
Lori Andrews, Body Science, 83 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (1997).
8. FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 180-82.
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fully drafting the informed consent document. The following hypo-
thetical is useful in illustrating these issues.
II. HYPOTHETICAL
Physician Doe routinely conducts breast biopsies on suspicious
masses found in the breasts of her patients. Before each surgery, Dr.
Doe explains the procedure and the attendant risks and obtains
informed consent from her patients. A pathology lab examines the
breast biopsies collected by Dr. Doe and catalogues and stores the
samples. After reviewing the pathology report, Dr. Doe contacts her
patients with the biopsy test results.
Geneticist Roe develops a genetic test designed to predict an
increased risk of breast cancer in women. Geneticist Roe and a team
of epidemiologists hope to confirm the validity and reliability of the
new genetic breast cancer test. Their proposed research protocol
requires the analysis of breast tissue samples. The researchers expect
to reduce their data collection costs by analyzing previously collected
breast tissue samples. Geneticist Roe realizes that pathology labs
throughout the country routinely store tissue samples sent to them for
analysis. The Roe research team contacts the pathology lab used by
Dr. Doe and requests access to the repository of breast tissue samples
stored in their freezers.
Attorney Black is retained by Ms. Jones, a patient of Dr. Doe,
after she learns that her breast tissue, removed by Dr. Doe during a
breast biopsy procedure, is being used for research purposes. Attor-
ney Black reviews the informed consent document signed by Ms.
Jones prior to surgery and fails to find a clause stating that tissue sam-
ples removed from Ms. Jones would be used in current or future
research projects. Furthermore, the informed consent document did
not notify Ms. Jones of the existence of a genetic test that could
determine whether she was at an increased risk for breast cancer or the
fact that this genetic test would be performed on her tissue sample.
Attorney Black files a claim against Dr. Doe and the Roe research
team asserting the following ten causes of action: (1) conversion, (2)
lack of informed consent, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) fraud and
deceit, (5) quasi-contract, (6) bad faith breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, (7) intentional infliction of emotional
distress, (8) negligent misrepresentation, (9) slander of title, and (10)
declaratory relief.
Attorney White is retained as defense counsel by the Roe
research team and Dr. Doe. Attorney White's defense centers on
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whether the Roe research team or Dr. Doe had an affirmative duty to
disclose genetic test results to Ms. Jones.
The issues raised by this hypothetical fact pattern will be the
subject matter of the background and analysis sections that follow.
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Human Genome
The human genome9 consists of approximately 70,000 to 100,000
pairs of genes"° found in twenty-three equivalent pairs of chromo-
somes.1 All nucleated somatic cells 2 in the human body contain two
sets of chromosomes. 3 The individual genes within each chromosome
are strung together in a double helix 4 form of deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA). The DNA in each nucleated cell of the same body is identi-
cal.'" Each DNA molecule contains about three billion nucleotides.16
Nucleotides combine with one another in one of four possible base
pairs.17 A useful visual analogy describes the nucleotide combination
as a spiral staircase.
DNA is composed of a long double helix, which looks like a
spiral staircase. The backbone of this molecule (i.e., the hand-
rails and balustrade of the staircase) consists of repeated
sequences of phosphate and deoxyribose sugar. Attached to the
sugar links in the backbone are four types of organic bases:
Adenine... , Guanine... , Cytosine... , and Thymine....
The steps of the staircase are formed by pairs of these
bases .... "
9. The human genome is the complement of genetic material in a set of chromosomes.
DAVID T. SUZUKI ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ANALYSIS 579 (3d ed. 1986).
10. A gene is the fundamental unit of heredity and is responsible for carrying information
from one generation to the next. Id. at 578.
11. A chromosome is "a linear end-to-end arrangement of genes." Id. at 575.
12. A somatic cell does not fuse with a cell of an opposite mating type to form a unique
diploid cell or zygote. As such, the genes of a somatic cell are not passed on to future genera-
tions. Id. at 586.
13. Id. at 34-35.
14. The double helix form was first introduced by Watson and Crick and describes two
interlocking chains of nucleotides that are joined by hydrogen bonds between paired bases.
ARTHUR P. MANGE & ELAINE JOHANSEN MANGE, GENETICS: HUMAN ASPECTS 296-97
(1980).
15. SUZUKI, supra note 9, at 34.
16. A nucleotide is the basic building block of nucleic acids. Id. at 582. Each nucleotide
molecule contains one of four nitrogen bases, a sugar and a phosphate group. Id.
17. Id. at 188.
18. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
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DNA molecules encode a person's genes with a blueprint for the
human organism. With the exception of identical twins, no two peo-
ple have identical DNA. 9
B. Genetic Disease and Testing
In 1988 Congress initiated the Human Genome Project (HGP), a
fifteen-year, three billion dollar research project designed to map and
sequence the human genome.2 One goal of the HGP is to develop
diagnostic tests and treatments for the more than five thousand dis-
eases with a genetic basis.21 The need for reliable diagnostic tests and
treatments is extraordinary, as more than fifteen million Americans
suffer from inherited diseases.22 Studies estimate that fifty-three out
of one thousand individuals will suffer from an inherited disease by
the time they reach the age of twenty-five.23
Technological advances of the 1980s made it possible to cut
DNA molecules into segments in order to isolate and analyze the
function of a specific gene. By studying large families affected with a
specific genetic disease, researchers are now able to identify DNA
markers that are always present in people who have or will develop the
disease. The DNA marker guides the researcher to the region of the
chromosome on which the mutated gene is found.24 Today, scientists
expect the Human Genome project to have ninety percent of the
eighty thousand genes in human DNA identified by the year 2000,
nearly five years ahead of schedule.2"
19. Identical twins have the same genotype. However, somatic mutation is possible due to
environmental factors. MANGE, supra note 1, at 531. See generally SUZUKI, note 9, at 2.
20. Leslie Roberts, Report Card on the Genome Project, 253 SCIENCE 376 (1991); Elke Jor-
dan, The Human Genome Project: Where Did It Come From, Where Is It Going?, 51 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 1 (1992); Hacsi Horvath, Mapping of Human Genome Sequence to Be Nearly Complete
by 2000, CNN INTERACTIVE, CNN.coM (June 11, 1999) <http://cnn.com/HEALTH/9906/
11/human.genome/>.
21. See Mark D. Guyer & Francis S. Collins, The Human Genome Project and the Future of
Medicine, 147 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 1145 (1993).
22. ALAN E.H. EMERY & DAVID L. RIMOIN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL
GENETICS 31 (2d ed. 1990).
23. Id.
24. The mutated genes responsible for fragile x syndrome, Marfan syndrome, cystic fibro-
sis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle cell anemia, myotonic dystrophy, some forms of inher-
itable cancer, heart disease, and rare forms of Alzheimer's disease are examples of the types of
disorders that have been isolated recently. See generally C. Thomas Caskey, Molecular Medicine
a Spin-Offfrom the Helix, 269 JAMA 1986 (1993).
25. Horvath, supra note 20.
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C. Bioethical Implications of Genetic Research with Human Subjects
Today, scientists, doctors, religious organizations, courts, and
legislative bodies are beginning to grapple with the possible conse-
quences of genetic research. Chief Justice Burger outlined a number
of the Supreme Court's concerns regarding genetic research in his
majority opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.26
To buttress his argument, the petitioner, with the support of
amicus, points to grave risks that may be generated by research
endeavors such as respondent's. The briefs present a gruesome
parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates, are
quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious
threat to the human race, or, at the very least, that the dangers
are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed apace
at this time. We are told that genetic research and related tech-
nological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it
may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may
tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are
forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at
times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces
it creates-that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better to "bear
those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of.,, 27
As a result, the majority concluded that policies regarding gene-
tic research should be left to the legislature.28
[W]e are without competence to entertain these arguments-
either to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the
unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make is
a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative proc-
ess after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that
legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That process
involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which
in our democratic system is the business of elected representa-
tives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on
us should be addressed to the political branches of the Govern-
ment, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.2 9
Reliable genetic tests and treatments for inherited diseases
should reduce health care costs and result in profits for clinical physi-
cians, medical researchers, research institutes, and pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies. In addition, improved reliability of genetic
26. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
27. Id. at 316.
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id.
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tests should lead to an increase in the use of these tests in the clinical
medical setting and forensics.
Because genetic tests are easily done on routinely collected blood
and tissue samples, patient privacy advocates voice concerns over the
access and control of DNA samples and other genetic information.30
Furthermore, the increased use of genetic tests encourages patient pri-
vacy advocates to seek restrictions on the collection, storage, and over-
sight of blood and tissue samples. 1
In 1993, in response to concerns of privacy advocates, the U.S.
Department of Energy's Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Working
Group (ELSI) of the Human Genome Project developed guidelines for
DNA banking designed to protect the privacy of individuals whose
DNA was stored.32 ELSI determined that, in order to protect the pri-
vacy of individuals whose DNA was stored, any proposed genetic
privacy act must also regulate the acquisition and analysis of the DNA
samples.33 The ELSI working group prepared a model Genetic Pri-
vacy Act for federal legislation. 4 The workgroup identified six core
provisions of the proposed Genetic Privacy Act: (1) the collection of
DNA for analysis is impermissible without an informed voluntary
consent; (2) DNA analysis cannot be undertaken without the verifica-
tion of the execution of written authorization; (3) the scope of DNA
analysis cannot exceed that specified in the written authorization; (4)
DNA is the property of the individual from whom it was collected; (5)
DNA samples must be destroyed once the authorized DNA analysis is
completed; and (6) persons who store private genetic information in
the course of their everyday business must keep the information confi-
dential and cannot disclose it unless authorized in writing by the indi-
vidual from whom it was collected.3"
The fundamental premise of the proposed act was that
no stranger should have or control identifiable DNA samples or
private genetic information about an individual, unless that
individual has specifically authorized the collection of DNA
samples for the purpose of genetic analysis, has authorized the
creation of that private information, and has access to and con-
30. See generally Henry T. Greely, Informed Consent, Stored Tissue Samples, and the Human
Genome Diversity Project: Protecting the Rights of Research Participants, in STORED TISSUE
SAMPLES, ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 89, 93-94 (Robert F. Weir
ed., 1998).
31. Id.
32. Patricia (Winnie) Roche et al., The Genetic Privacy Act: A Proposal for National Legis-
lation, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 4 (1996). See also Greely, supra note 30.
33. Roche et al., supra note 32, at 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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trol over the dissemination of that information.36
ELSI's proposed Genetic Privacy Act pertains solely to issues of
privacy and confidentiality of already collected genetic information
and, as such, does not address other policy issues surrounding the
creation or collection of genetic information.37
More recently, the Human Genome Organization (HUGO)38
asked a group of ethicists to consider whether close relatives of
patients should have access to stored genetic information and under
what circumstances researchers might use tissue and blood samples
collected during routine medical care.39 In December 1997, after
reviewing eighty official policy statements on the control of blood and
tissue samples and the control of genetic information, the ethicists
released a draft of six recommended guidelines.4"
First, genetic information is personal and familial. If a condition
is serious and inheritable, then the patient should be encouraged to
inform his or her relatives of their increased risk.4 Second, blood and
tissue samples collected during routine medical care can be used for
research, given the following: the patient is notified of the use, the
patient did not object to the use, and the blood or tissue samples have
been anonymized.42 Third, samples collected during routine medical
care and stored by the researcher prior to the institution of a policy of
notification can be used in research provided that the blood or tissue
samples have been anonymized.43 Fourth, research samples can be
used for other research provided that the patient is notified of the
potential other use, the patient did not object to the other use, and the
blood or tissue samples have been anonymized.44 Fifth, the researcher
must institute security mechanisms in order to ensure confidential-
ity.4" Finally, "unless authorized by law, research results should [not]
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. HUGO is an international group of scientists and others working on the Human
Genome Project. HUGO supports the collection of data used in efforts to sequence the human
genome and organizes workshops to encourage researchers to think about ethical, social, and
legal issues relating to the Human Genome Project. See Joan Stephenson, Ethics Group Drafts
Guidelines for Control of Genetic Material and Information, 279 JAMA 184 (1998).
39. Id.
40. The ethicists did not address issues regarding the ownership of research samples.
41. Stephenson, supra note 38, at 185.
42. Id. Although originally collected with identifying information, anonymized research
samples have been irreversibly stripped of all identifiers. Karen K. Steinberg et al., Use of Stored
Tissue Samples for Genetic Research in Epidemiologic Studies, in STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETH-
ICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 82, 84 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1998).
43. Stephenson, supra note 38, at 185.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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be disclosed to institutional third parties ... even with patient con-
sent."46
The HUGO recommendations, however, are not internally con-
sistent. The HUGO ethicists begin with the proposition that genetic
information is personal and familial. As a result, they recommend
that a person with a serious genetic disorder should inform his blood
relatives of his condition. However, if HUGO's second, third, and
fourth propositions are adhered to, then the person could never learn
the results of his genetic tests, because the medical researcher would
be required to anonymize the blood or tissue samples.
Although the recommendations of the ELSI workgroup and the
HUGO ethicists address some of the issues surrounding the disclosure
of genetic information, additional risks are posed by the collection and
analysis of genetic material. Consider the risk posed by groups who
control resources and may use genetic information to ration an indi-
vidual's access to these resources.4 7 However, a more subtle risk con-
cerns how the disclosure of genetic information threatens the contract
and property interests of the individual from whom the genetic infor-
mation was collected. Challenges to disclosure of genetic information
can be based in three areas of law: tort, contract, and property. The
facts relevant to deciding whether an affirmative duty to disclose
genetic test results exists will vary depending on the area of law from
which the court recognizes the claim to arise.
D. Tort Law and the Disclosure of Medical Information
1. A Physician's General Duty to Disclose Medical Information
Under common law, a person owes no duty to control the con-
duct of another or to warn others of anticipated conduct.48 As a result,
courts have found that patients have limited privileges against disclo-
46. Id.
47. See Roche et al., supra note 32, at 3.
48. The California Supreme Court, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
551 P.2d 334, 343 n.5 (Cal. 1976) (citations omitted), explained the common law rule in the fol-
lowing terms, "Morally questionable, the rule owes its survival to 'the difficulties of setting any
standards of unselfish service to fellow men, and of making any workable rule to cover possible
situations where fifty people might fail to rescue ... ' See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315 (1965):
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor
and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right of protection.
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sure of personal medical information by their physicians.49 An excep-
tion to the common law rule exists when the defendant has some
special relationship with the person whose conduct needs to be con-
trolled or is in a relationship with a foreseeable victim of the conduct."0
Section 314A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts enumerates
four relationships in which an actor is under a duty to another:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passenger to take
reasonable action .... (2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty
to his guests. (3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the
public is under a similar duty to members of the public who
enter in response to his invitation. (4) One who is required by
law to take or who voluntarily takes custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal oppor-
49. See generally Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 120 Cal. Rptr. 566, 571 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975) (concluding that while a hospital had no common law duty to warn the plaintiffs, a
mother and her daughter, that the daughter had contracted a contagious disease, a reporting stat-
ute did impose a duty on the attending physician to advise the mother and daughter of the conta-
gious disease); Tooley v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, 618 (La. Ct.
App. 1963) (upholding a physician's disclosure of his female patient's medical records to her
husband on the grounds that the plaintiffs husband had a right to his wife's medical records and
possessed the right to disclose the records to others because the husband "is head and master of
the community"); Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345, 345 (N.J. 1962) (holding that a physician
can disclose information about an infant's congenital heart condition to an insurer because a
patient's right of nondisclosure can be superseded by the interest of society in an honest and just
result or a legitimate interest in the patient's health); Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d. 470, 471
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding that a physician can disclose information pertaining to his female
patient to her husband because the information may have a bearing on the marital relation);
Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817-18 (Utah 1958) (finding that medical information is condi-
tionally privileged due to the rule of good sense and customary conduct of good will, but the
happiness and well-being of the young lady courting the plaintiff were interests sufficient to jus-
tify disclosure of the plaintiffs mental status by his physician).
50. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343 (citations omitted). See also Olson v. Children's Home Soc'y
of Cal., 252 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (having knowledge of a genetic condition in a
child given up for adoption fails to create a duty to disclose such information to blood relatives
who may have an interest in the information, because no special relationship existed between the
biological mother of the child given up for adoption and the Children's Home Society of Califor-
nia); Vause v. Bay Medical Center, 687 So. 2d 258, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
an action for medical negligence could not be filed absent privity between the patient and the
physician); Calwell v. Hassan, 925 P.2d 422, 431-32 (Kan. 1996) (refusing to find a physician-
outpatient relationship to be a special relationship because the relationship did not create a situa-
tion where the physician could control the conduct of the patient); Ellis v. Peter, 627 N.Y.S.2d
707, 709 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (ruling that a physician treating a patient for tuberculosis had no
duty to warn the patient's wife of the risks of her contracting tuberculosis from her husband,
because the physician and the wife did not have a physician-patient relationship, the doctor did
not breach a statutory duty to the wife, and the doctor did not owe the wife a duty of reasonable
care); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that the existence of the
physician-patient relationship is sufficient to impose upon the physician a duty to warn identifi-
able third parties in the patient's family of foreseeable risks of the patient's illness).
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tunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other."1
Yet, the duty arising out of a special relationship is only "to exer-
cise reasonable care under the circumstances.' '2 At least one court has
looked beyond the special relationship between the psychotherapist
defendant and his patient and held that the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, the moral blame of the defendant, and the prevention of
future harm were additional considerations in finding an affirmative
duty. 3
2. The Specific Duty of a Physician to Disclose
Genetic Test Results
The duty of a physician to disclose the presence of genetic dis-
ease is rarely addressed in case law. Typically, courts have only
addressed issues surrounding the impact and use of genetic tests in
causes of action claiming wrongful birth, wrongful life, questions of
paternity, failure to warn third parties of genetic transferability of a
disease, and sufficiency of forensic evidence.
For example, in Schroeder v. Perkel,"4 the New Jersey Supreme
Court considered whether a defendant physician owed a duty to the
plaintiff parents to diagnose their daughter's illness and inform them
that she had cystic fibrosis.55 The court reasoned that "the scope of
duty in negligence ... is coextensive with the reasonable ... conse-
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. e (1965).
53. See L.J. Deftos, Genomic Torts: The Law of the Future-The Duty of Physicians to Dis-
close the Presence of a Genetic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 105,
132 (1997). See also Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a psy-
chiatrist's failure to warn the patient's girlfriend of the patient's violent tendencies was the
proximate cause of the girlfriend's death); Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr.
2d 518, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a physician had a duty to warn the patient or her
parents of the danger of her HIV diagnosis in order to protect unknown third parties from harm);
Werner v. Varner, Stafford, & Seaman, 659 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling
a physician owed no duty to a motorist for failing to warn a patient not to drive while taking an
antiepileptic medication because a duty is only owed to identifiable parties not the public at
large); Ranier v. Frieman, 682 A.2d 1220, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (citations
omitted) (concluding that an ophthalmologist, as a professional, owes a duty to the patient and to
third parties who will foreseeably rely on his skill or care because, "existence of a duty is a ques-
tion of law to be determined by the court as a matter of fairness and policy by 'weighing the rela-
tionship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution');
Estate of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 673 N.E.2d 1311, 1324 (Ohio 1997)
(holding that a psychotherapist treating a patient in an outpatient setting did have a special rela-
tionship with the patient because (1) a physician can have a duty to others with whom he has no
relationship, (2) a duty can result from the public's interest in containing risks, and (3) a physi-
cian has a duty to protect others from a danger of which he is aware or should be aware).
54. 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
55. Id. at 838
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quences of the negligent act in question."" Because a family is bound
together with the fibers of life, when one member of the family is
damaged by a negligent act, the whole family suffers the conse-
quences.57 Therefore, the court concluded that a physician's duty
might extend beyond the interests of the patient to the immediate
family members of the patient who might be adversely affected by the
breach of the physician's duty."
Similarly, in Pate v. Threlkel, 9 the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court when it con-
sidered whether a physician has a duty to warn his or her patient of a
genetically transferable disease and to whom a duty to warn of the
nature of a disease run. A Florida medical malpractice statute imposes
a statutory standard of care that requires a reasonably prudent health
care provider to warn a patient of the genetically transferable character
of the patient's condition.6" Because the case went to the supreme
court on appeal from an order granting the physician's motion to dis-
miss, the record was not developed with regard to expert testimony on
the issue of standard of care.6 As a result, the court accepted the
plaintiffs allegations that, pursuant to the standard of care, the defen-
dant physician was under a duty.62 While past decisions required
privity between the physician and the patient to maintain a cause of
action against a physician, the court noted that in other professional
relationships the privity requirement had been relaxed to extend the
rights of identified third parties to recover from a professional because
that party was the intended beneficiary of the standard of care.63
Accordingly, the Threlkel court concluded that because the prevailing
standard of care created a duty to warn that plainly benefited identi-
fied third parties, the physician's duty must run to those third par-
ties.64
In Safer v. Estate of Pack,65 the New Jersey Supreme Court again
found itself faced with the issue of whether a physician has a duty to
warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a genetically
transmissible condition that extends beyond the patient to identified
members of the patient's family who may be affected by the physi-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 839.
58. Id.
59. 661 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 1995).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 281.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 282.
65. 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 1996).
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cian's breach. There, the plaintiff sued her father's physician for fail-
ing to warn her of the risks that passed to her from her father's
inheritable form of colon cancer.66 Although the court ruled that the
physician owed a duty to his patient and his patient's immediate iden-
tifiable family, much like the Florida court in Pate, the court's ruling
was narrower than the Pate court's in defining the scope of the cir-
cumstances in which the duty to warn would be satisfied by informing
the patient.67
The Safer court posited that it may be possible for a conflict to
arise between the duty to warn and a patient's expressed preference
that nothing be revealed to family members about the patient's condi-
tion.68 In such a conflict, a court would be faced with determining, as
a matter of law, whether there are or should be limits to physician-
patient confidentiality.69 While these decisions addressed a physi-
cian's duty of care, many nonphysicians are also involved in genetic
research. Whether a nonphysician genetic researcher owes a duty of
care to his or her research subject is explored in the following section.
3. The Specific Duty of a Nonphysician Medical Researcher to
Disclose Genetic Test Results
No court has yet been faced with deciding whether a nonphysi-
cian medical researcher has an affirmative duty to disclose genetic test
results to a research subject or other third party. Under the common
law of tort, the nonphysician medical researcher owes no duty to dis-
close unless a special relationship exists between the researcher and the
research subject or third party that imposes a duty upon the
researcher. 7' However, although a researcher-research subject rela-
tionship is not enumerated in section 314A of the Restatement of
Torts, those relationships enumerated in section 314A were not
intended to be exclusive.71 The duties associated with section 314A
arise from the special relationship between the parties," and the spe-
cial relationship creates a special responsibility. 71 In general, the law
recognizes a duty to aid or protect in any relationship of dependence
or of mutual dependence.74
66. Id. at 1190.
67. Id. at 1192.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1193.
70. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-22 (1965).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A cmt. b (1965).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Like a physician-patient relationship, a nonphysician medical
researcher-research subject relationship generally arises through con-
tract. Because a nonphysician medical researcher possesses specialized
knowledge, that knowledge may serve to make the research subject
dependent on the researcher.7" Furthermore, the researcher's special-
ized knowledge may serve to make the researcher a fiduciary of the
research subject.76
A fiduciary relationship could also be supported under a theory
of the nonphysician medical researcher acting as an agent. Agency is a
fiduciary relationship created by the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the first person will act on the second's behalf
and subject to the second's control and consent to act.77  Conse-
quently, a nonphysician medical researcher acting as an agent of the
research subject would owe a duty of loyalty to his or her research
subject 8.7  Thus, recognizing the specialized knowledge of the
researcher and accepting the agency argument, a court, under tort law,
could view the nonphysician medical researcher-research subject rela-
tionship to be a special relationship that supports an affirmative duty.
However, circumstances exist where a nonphysician medical
researcher's broad duty to disclose genetic test results would conflict
with prevailing medical, social, and legal policies. 79  For example, a
duty to disclose anonymized research samples would be impossible for
the researcher to fulfill. Similarly, the researcher's duty of disclosure
could be precluded by a statute, or by a research subject's express wish
for nondisclosure, informed consent.
An Illinois appellate court was recently faced with such a situa-
tion."o The Illinois Masonic Medical Center operates a research pro-
75. However, if the research subject's samples are anonymized, then the possibility that the
researcher-research subject relation is based on unilateral dependence or mutual dependence
seems to be greatly reduced, if not impossible.
76. See Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 108
(1986); Theodore R. Lebang & Jane L. King, Tort Liability for Nondisclosure: The Physician's
Legal Obligations to Disclose Patient Illness and Injury, 89 DICK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) (theorizing
that as courts expand the doctrine of informed consent and broaden the physician's fiduciary dis-
closure obligation, the personal rights of a patient are emphasized so as to grant the patient con-
trol over his or her body); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A
New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 259 (1985) (theorizing that a physician's specialized
knowledge makes her a fiduciary to those who depend on her, thereby requiring the physician to
justify her competence in the transaction through disclosure and seeking the agreement of the
patient).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
78. See id. § 387 ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to
act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency").
79. See Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1193 (N.J. 1996).
80. See Doe v. Illinois Masonic Med. Ctr., 696 N.E.2d 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
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gram designed to reduce the incidence of cystic fibrosis. The research
protocol involves the removal of several ova from a female research
subject to be tested for the presence of the cystic fibrosis gene.
Healthy ova, not containing the diseased gene, are then fertilized and
implanted into the female research subject.
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center were the
parents of a baby girl born with cystic fibrosis after her mother under-
went the preimplantation procedure described above.81 The Does had
one older son with cystic fibrosis.8 2 Therefore, they decided to
undergo the experimental procedure.83
The issue before the Illinois appellate court was whether the Illi-
nois Medical Studies Act precluded the production of all documents
relevant to the preimplantation genetic testing procedure.84 Because
the legislative intent of the Illinois Medical Studies Act was "to
encourage candid and voluntary studies and programs used to improve
hospital conditions and patient care or to reduce the rates of death and
disease,"8" the court concluded that the interests of the plaintiffs must
yield to the interests of confidentiality, privacy, and peer review within
medical institutions.86 As a result, all documents relating to the
research protocol, including the hospital Internal Review Board (IRB)
approvals of the research protocol, could not be produced under the
Illinois Medical Studies Act.87
The Doe decision is one example of a statute precluding a duty to
disclose information surrounding medical research data collection and
analysis.88 The facts available in the Doe opinion do not indicate the
81. If the preimplantation procedure had been successful, the Doe's daughter would have
been the first baby born without cystic fibrosis as a result of the research protocol. Id. at 708.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Illinois Medical Studies Act provides that: "[ajll information used in the
course of... medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving
patient care or increasing organ and tissue donation, shall be privileged, strictly confidential and
shall be used only for medical research." Id. at 709.
85. Id. at 710-11 (citing Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E. 2d 937, 942 (I11. 985)).
86. Id. at 711.
87. The court noted that this decision should not inhibit patients from maintaining causes
of action for medical malpractice, because the Medical Studies Act does not prohibit access to a
patient's own medical records, and the patient could depose all persons involved in his or her
treatment and hire experts to define the quality of care received. Id.
88. In Washington, § 42.48.040 of the Revised Code of Washington defines four circum-
stances under which a research professional may disclose research records: (1) the research sub-
ject or the subject's personal representative has given informed written consent; (2) "the
researcher reasonably believes that disclosure will prevent or minimize injury to [the subject] and
the disclosure is limited to information necessary to protect the [subject]"; (3) the research data is
disclosed for the purposes of auditing a research program; or (4) the research data is disclosed in
response to a search warrant or court order. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.48.040 (1998).
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professional status of the researchers involved in the research protocol
at issue. Rather, the court noted that the Illinois Medical Studies Act
extends to protect all medical research that advances hospital condi-
tions and patient care, or reduces the prevalence of disease or mortal-
ity.8 9 As a result, in Illinois, both physician and nonphysician medical
researchers are afforded the same protections under the Illinois Medi-
cal Studies Act.9"
In addition to its discussion of nonphysician disclosure, the Doe
decision implicates another tort-contract basis for supporting a finding
of no duty to disclose for medical researchers: informed consent.
E. Informed Consent and the Research Subject/
Third Party Expectation Interest
1. General Theory of Informed Consent91
Informed consent requires medical and behavioral professionals
to inform their patients and human subjects of the risks and benefits
of the procedures involved with their care and to obtain the patient's
or subject's agreement to undergo the procedures.92 The doctrine of
informed consent has its origins in the contemporary view of the col-
laborative nature of the physician-patient relationship. 93 The doctrine
accomplishes two primary objectives: to promote individual auton-
omy and to encourage rational decision making.94 The central premise
of informed consent is that all decisions about the medical care of a
patient will be carried out so that the patient's authorization for the
care is given intentionally, voluntarily, and with substantial under-
standing.9"
89. Doe, 696 N.E.2d at 710-11.
90. Id. at 710.
91. Many scholars have written on the history and practical applications of the doctrine of
informed consent. See generally, PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (1984).
92. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 76, at 69.
93. See APPELBAUM, supra note 91, at 41.
94. GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION:
THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 34 (1977).
95. Gail Geller et al., Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-Onset Cancer: The Process
and Content of Inforned Consent, 277 JAMA 1467, 1468 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
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2. Informed Consent in the Clinical Medical Setting
Judge Cardozo effectively captured the values behind the doc-
trine of informed consent when he wrote, "Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent, commits an assault .. ."96 A physician
in a clinical setting owes his or her patient a duty to inform as part of
his or her professional care. 97 The physician must provide the patient
96. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
97. ANNAS, supra note 94, at 285. In 1966 the American Medical Association (AMA)
adopted the ethical principles set forth in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki of the World Medical
Association concerning human experimentation. Id. The AMA drafted four guidelines to aid
physicians in meeting their ethical responsibilities while performing clinical investigation:
1. A physician may participate in clinical investigation only to the extent that his acti-
vities are part of a systematic program competently designed, under accepted
standards of scientific research, to produce data which is scientifically valid and
significant.
2. In conducting clinical investigation, the investigator should demonstrate the same
concern and caution for the welfare, safety and comfort of the person involved as
is required of a physician who is furnishing medical care to a patient independent
of any clinical investigation.
3. In clinical investigation primarily for treatment-
A. The physician must recognize that the physician- patient relationship exists
and that he is expected to exercise his professional judgment and skill in the
best interest of the patient.
B. Voluntary consent must be obtained from the patient, or from his legally
authorized representative if the patient lacks the capacity to consent, follow-
ing: (a) [sic] disclosure that the physician intends to use an investigational
drug or experimental procedure, (b) a reasonable explanation of the nature of
the drug or procedure to be used, risks to be expected, and possible thera-
peutic benefits, (c) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the drug or
procedure, and (d) a disclosure of alternative drugs and procedures that may
be available.
4. In clinical investigation primarily for the accumulation of scientific knowledge-
A. Adequate safeguards must be provided for the welfare, safety and comfort of
the subject.
B. Consent, in writing, should be obtained from the subject, or from his legally
authorized representative if the subject lacks the capacity to consent, follow-
ing: (a) a disclosure of the fact that an investigational drug or procedure is to
be used, (b) a reasonable explanation of the nature of the procedure to be
used and risks to be expected, and (c) an offer to answer any inquiries con-
cerning the drug or procedure.
C. Minors or mentally incompetent persons may be used as subjects only if:
i. The nature of the investigation is such that mentally competent adults
would not be suitable subjects.
ii. Consent, in writing, is given by a legally authorized representative of
the subject under circumstances in which an informed and prudent
adult would reasonably be expected to volunteer himself or his child as
a subject.
D. No person may be used as a subject against his will.
Id. at 285-87 (emphasis in original)
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with sufficient information to allow the patient to make an intelli-
gently informed decision as to his or her care.9" However, a number of
exceptions to a physician's duty to disclose have been identified by the
courts: (1) when the disclosure relates to minor or remote risks,99 (2)
when the patient was aware of the risk,' ° (3) when the existence of the
risk was common knowledge,' (4) when the risk was not known to
the medical community, 1 2 (5) when the risk exists only if the medical
procedure is improperly performed,0 3 (6) when the patient expressly
requests not to be informed,0 4 (7) when the medical treatment is being
performed during a medical emergency,' and (8) when disclosure
would cause the patient's condition to deteriorate. 106
To recover for a failure to disclose under the rules of professional
malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the physician violated his or
her duty to inform. 1 7 In addition, the plaintiff must show that the
physician's nondisclosure caused a recognizable harm under the law of
negligence.' 8 Most jurisdictions use an objective standard of causa-
tion in medical malpractice informed consent cases. This standard
requires the plaintiff to show that the undisclosed information would
have induced not just the plaintiff, but also a reasonable patient, to
withhold consent to the treatment.
3. Informed Consent in the Research Setting' °9
Early case law held that a duty of informed consent for physi-
cians in a research setting equals the duty of informed consent for
physicians in a clinical setting."0 Informed consent increases the gen-
eral fund of knowledge surrounding the research project and genetic
tests. A physician researcher must disclose any information that
might somehow influence a research subject's decision to participate in
the study. In fact, the scope of information a physician is required to
98. See id.
99. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
100. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
101. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972).
102. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (Wis. 1973).
103. Mull v. Emory University, 150 S.E.2d 276, 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
104. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 12.
105. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788.
106. Wilkinson, 295 A.2d at 689 (citations omitted).
107. Shultz, supra note 76, at 227.
108. Id.
109. See Bartha Maria Knoppers, Human Genetic Material: Commodity or Gift?, STORED
TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 226 (Robert F.
Weir ed., 1998) (providing a proposed model consent form for DNA sampling and storage for
medical research).
110. Cf. Application of Hyman, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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disclose includes the physician's economic and research interests."'
Furthermore, a physician is liable under breach of informed consent
for a procedure or protocol performed on a subject who did not give
informed consent.'12
From the perspective of the research subject, disclosure informs
the subject about the nature of the project. The subject learns the
risks and benefits associated with participation in the research proto-
col. As a result, research subjects can better avail themselves of the
benefits and avoid the risks associated with the research.'1 13
Additionally, obtaining informed consent serves the interests of
researchers. Disclosure reduces the researcher's risk that the research
subject will pursue legal action if his or her expectations concerning
the outcomes of the research project are not fulfilled.114 Furthermore,
disclosure reinforces a general societal interest in respecting the auton-
omy of human subjects and avoiding harm to human subjects
involved in research programs."' Thus, disclosure reduces the costs
associated with placating an unhappy research subject or any resultant
litigation.
4. Federal Law and Informed Consent
The general requirements for informed consent appear in Title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 16 Under Title 45, Section
46.116 of the C.F.R., the researcher is required to provide the research
subject with the following information:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explana-
tion of the purposes of the research and the expected dura-
tion of the subject's participation, a description of the
procedures to be followed, and identification of any proce-
dures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or dis-
comforts to the subject;
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or to others
which may reasonably be expected from the research;
111. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 484 (Cal. 1990).
112. See Blanton v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D.D.C. 1977); Schwartz v. Bos-
ton Hosp. for Women, 422 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
113. Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue
Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1787 (1995).
114. Id. at 1788.
115. Id.
116. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1998).
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(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or
courses of treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to
the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confi-
dentiality of records identifying the subject will be main-
tained;
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an expla-
nation as to whether any compensation and an explanation
as to whether any medical treatments are available if injury
occurs and, if so, what they consist of, or where further
information may be obtained;
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to perti-
nent questions about the research and research subjects'
rights, and whom to contact in the event of a research-
related injury to the subject; and
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to par-
ticipate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which
the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may dis-
continue participation at any time without penalty or loss
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.'17
Federal law prohibits research on human subjects unless the
investigator has obtained legally effective informed consent. Federal
law applies to all research involving human subjects that is conducted,
supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal depart-
ment or agency." 8  The federal regulations represent an effort by
Congress to balance society's needs for increased knowledge with the
protection of individual interests, while reflecting the post-World War
II concern for the rights and welfare of human research subjects.' 19
117. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (1998).
118. See45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1998).
119. The Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal formulated the first code designed to protect
the rights of human subjects. The Nuremberg Code explained the principle behind the doctrine
of informed consent as follows:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means
that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situ-
ated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of con-
straint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the
elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of
an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
5. Research Using Anonymized Samples
Federal regulations exempt anonymized samples from the
requirements of informed consent in three situations: (1) where the
research protocol uses existing specimens or data, (2) where the
research data is publicly available, and (3) where the subjects cannot
be identified.12' As a result, researchers can remove identifiers from
existing samples without seeking consent for their use in data analy-
sis.121
Typically, researchers use their currently funded data collection
protocols as an opportunity to collect additional samples for future
research projects. 122  However, researchers collecting anonymous
research samples for future tests should obtain informed consent.
Ethicists believe that if the purpose of the future test is known at the
time of collection, then the researcher should obtain informed con-
sent. 123
Interestingly, there might be an exception to obtaining informed
consent on the collection of samples for future research if the sample is
collected in a clinical setting where the subject seeks medical treat-
ment. Federal regulations define a human subject as a person about
whom the researcher obtains data through interventions with the per-
son. 124 "Intervention includes both physical procedures by which data
are gathered (for example, venipuncture) and manipulations of the
subject or the subject's environment that are performed for research
purposes (emphasis added)."'25 Thus, it may be argued that an indi-
vidual whose interventions occur in a clinical setting, and, thus, not
for research purposes, is not a human subject by definition.
Of course, legally, if the sample involves private information, the
person is a human subject regardless of where the sample is col-
lected. 12' Thus, the clinician faces an ethical problem in that it would
which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected;
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his partici-
pation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon
each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a personal
duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.
Nuremberg Code, reprinted in Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 76, at 71-72 n.14.
120. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (1998).
121. Some ethicists find this practice to be problematic, as the researcher had an opportu-
nity to obtain consent and chose not to do so. See Clayton et al., supra note 113, at 1787-88.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 1791.
124. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (1998).
125. Id.
126. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(0(2) (1998).
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be deceptive to collect samples in a clinical setting knowing they will
probably be used for research.
Federally mandated institutional review boards (IRBs)'27 could
offer a solution to these ethical problems. 8 An IRB is established by
the institution where the research is being conducted and is composed
of a cross-section of the scientific and lay community. 9 IRBs are
intended to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects from
abuses by research investigators. 13' An IRB contains at least five per-
sons with varied backgrounds.' 31 For instance, there must be at least
one member who is not a scientist and at least one member who is not
affiliated with the institution. 132 The varied backgrounds are intended
to promote the complete and adequate review of research proposals. 3
IRBs approve and monitor research proposals to ensure informed
consent. 34  While the content of the written report submitted to an
IRB may vary by institution, in general, the report contains the fol-
lowing information:
(1) the purpose of the study; (2) the past experimental and clini-
cal findings leading to the proposed protocol; (3) the names of
the organizations contributing funds for the research program;
(4) an estimate of the number of subjects and controls to be
included in the research protocol and a statement describing the
population from which they are derived; (5) the specific location
where the research subjects will be contacted; (6) an estimate of
the duration of the entire study; (7) a description of the intended
research methodology to be used; (8) a description of all poten-
tial risks to the research subject, including an estimate of their
frequency severity, and reversibility; (9) a description of any
precautions the researcher will take to avoid harm to the research
subjects, how the researcher will monitor and detect these
harms, and the point at which the study will be terminated if
these harms occur; (10) the procedures to be used to ensure con-
127. In addition, some health care institutions have organized institutional ethics commit-
tees (IECs) as a means by which to address ethical dilemmas by educating the hospital admini-
stration or staff, assisting in the development of health care institution policy, and providing a
forum for the resolution of cases involving appropriate patient care. FURROW ET AL., supra note
4 at 391-2. Typically, the structure of an IEC varies considerably from one institution to
another, as it is not federally regulated. Id.
128. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(b) (1998).
129. FURROW ETAL., supra note 4, at 387.
130. NATHAN HERSHEY & ROBERT D. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE
LAW 10 (1976).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. HERSHEY, supra note 130, at 24-31.
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fidentiality of the data and the identity of the research subjects;
(11) the scientific qualifications of the researcher; (12) prior IRB
determinations; and (13) a written consent form. 13s
Although federal regulations do not give specific guidelines as to
how the IRB should make its findings, the IRB must make the fol-
lowing four findings in order to approve a research proposal in which a
research subject's consent is limited or not obtained: (1) the risks to
the subjects must be minimized, (2) the waiver or alteration of
informed consent must not affect the rights of the subjects, (3) the
research program could not practicably be carried out absent the
waiver or alteration of informed consent, and (4) the subjects will be
provided with additional information after participating, whenever
136appropriate.
Thus, the task of an IRB is to evaluate whether the risks faced by
the research subject are reasonable when compared with the benefits
to be realized by the research subject and the importance of the scien-
tific knowledge gained by following the research protocol. 37 In this
way, federal regulations place the duty on the research institution to
protect the rights of the research subjects.'38
6. Research with Identifiable Samples
Some people want to know their personal genetic information.
For others, the prospect of knowing personal genetic information elic-
its feelings of anxiety and can even cause family ties to become
strained when family members do not want to know the informa-
tion.1 39  However, no matter what one's position is, in contrast to
anonymous samples, subject consent is generally required for research
using linkable or identifiable samples. 4 '
One unique issue pertaining to linkable samples is "look-back"
liability. "Look-back" liability is particularly important when a
researcher fails to recontact current or past subjects when new diag-
nostic or treatment protocols are developed. Thus, using linkable
samples would increase the researcher's liability risk.
135. Id.
136. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d)(1-4) (1998).
137. FURROW ET AL., supra note 4, at 387-88.
138. Failure to comply with the federal regulations would result in the research institute
losing its federal funds.
139. Experiences of anxiety are probably amplified when no effective treatment for a given
genetic condition exists, when issues surrounding access to reproductive planning are high-
lighted, or when the availability of genetic information to employers and insurers may result in
barriers to receiving jobs or insurance.
140. Clayton, supra note 113, at 1789.
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However, if the findings are unclear or no effective interventions
exist, then the researcher would have no liability. To compound the
problems surrounding disclosure, federal regulations governing
research with human subjects may not apply when the subject has
died) 41
7. Research Using Samples of the Deceased
Some ethicists argue that if the genetic information might impact
the health of a living blood relative, the federal restrictions imposed on
the samples of living subjects should be extended to the samples of
subjects who are deceased.' Of course, the researcher should respect
the deceased subject's express wishes as to whether the subject wanted
samples of his or her remains to be used in research. In addition, the
researcher should respect recognized property rights that are held by
heirs and assigns in the bodies of deceased research subjects.143 As the
Brotherton court stated,
The importance of establishing rights in a dead body has been,
and will continue to be, magnified by scientific advancements.
The recent explosion of research and information concerning
biotechnology has created a market place in which human tis-
sues are routinely sold to and by scientists, physicians and
others. [After all], the human body is a valuable resource. As
biotechnology continues to develop, so will the capacity to culti-
vate the resources in a dead body. A future in which hearts,
kidneys, and other valuable organs could be maintained for
expanded periods outside a live body is far from inconceiv-
able.1 44
As this discussion demonstrates, the need for clarifying the scope
of property rights in biological samples has never been greater.
F. Property and a Duty to Disclose
1. General Theory of Property
In the early United States, the legal concept of property was
expansive in scope, encompassing land, faculties, and conscience.14s
Property interests were viewed as the best means for protecting the life
141. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102() (1998).
142. Clayton, supra note 113, at 1790.
143. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
144. Id.
145. See James Madison, Property, 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101, 102
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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and liberty of individuals.146 American courts have recognized that
property consists of a collection of interests that are incident to owner-
ship and protected by the state: "rights, duties, claims, exemptions,
and immunities." '47 The Restatement of Property considers property
to be the legal relations between parties with respect to the subject of
property. 48 The first chapter of the Restatement of Property defines
four legal concepts that describe the legal relations between parties
with respect to property: right, privilege, power, and immunity.149 To
have complete property ownership in a given object, a person must
possess all of the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that are
legally possible.15
2. Genetic Information as Property
Both the Hohfeldian and Restatement of Property concepts of
property support the notion that an individual owns his or her genetic
information. First, an individual possesses the DNA encoded in his or
her genes. Second, an individual has the exclusive right to use the
genetic information in his or her body. Third, an individual's genetic
information can be wasted, modified, destroyed, or alienated only by
the person in whom it resides. Fourth, an individual can control who
has access to his or her genetic information. Lastly, only the individ-
ual can give his or her genetic information away.'
146. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
147. Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87
Nw. UL. REV. 1037, 1054-55 (1993).
148. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1-4, ch. 1, introductory note (1936).
149. Barrad, supra, note 147, at 1056. The concepts of right, privilege, power, and immu-
nity were originally developed by Wesley Hohfeld and adopted by the American Law Institute
in 1936 in the Restatement of Property. The Restatement of Property defines the four legal con-
cepts as follows:
A right ... is a legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the other
shall do a given act or shall not do a given act.... A privilege.., is a legal freedom
on the part of one person as a against another to do a given act or a legal freedom not
to do a given act .... A power ... is an ability on the part of a person to produce a
change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act .... An immu-
nity. . . is a freedom on the part of one person against having a given legal relation
altered by a given act or omission to act on the part of another person.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1-4 (1936).
150. See id. § 5 cmt. e. Thus, the Restatement of Property makes a distinction between a
person who owns one or more interests in an object, a partial owner, and a person who owns all
the interests in an object, a complete owner. Id. See generally Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d
477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the aggregate of rights that constitute a wife's property
interest in her deceased spouse's body are sufficient to rise to the level of a legitimate claim of
entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Fuller v.
Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs interest in the decedent's remains is only a
limited property interest); Ravellette v. Smith, 300 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1962).
151. The most common means by which a person can give his or her genetic information
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However, a person is not a complete owner in his or her genetic
property. For example, a person does not retain a property interest in
skin cells that are shed as he or she walks down the road because these
cells are no longer in the exclusive control of the person.
Yet, courts have found property rights in a variety of human bio-
logical samples including dead bodies,'52 feces,153 preembryos, ' and
sperm. 5 One exception is the landmark case of Moore v. Regents of
the University of California,"6 that refused to recognize a property
right in spleen cells removed for therapeutic reasons and later used in
medical research.
In Moore, the plaintiff, John Moore, "allege[d] that his physician
failed to disclose [his] preexisting research and economic interests in
[Mr. Moore's] cells [prior] to obtaining [informed] consent to the
medical procedures by which [the cells] were extracted."'5 7  Moore
sought treatment at the Medical Center of the University of Califor-
nia, at Los Angeles for hairy-cell leukemia. 5 Dr. David Golde, one
of five defendants and the attending physician, confirmed Mr.
Moore's diagnosis and recommended that Mr. Moore's spleen be
removed."5 9 Moore consented to the splenectomy and the surgery was
performed. 6 ' For the next seven years, Moore traveled from his home
in Seattle to UCLA Medical Center at Dr. Golde's request in order to
ensure his health and well-being. 6' During these visits, Dr. Golde
collected samples of Moore's blood, skin, bone marrow, and sperm.'62
away would be to donate his or her cells to others or to provide his or her offspring with a copy of
his or her DNA.
152. Many courts faced with the issue of whether a property interest exists in a dead body
have found that a quasi-property right exists. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481; Arnaud v. Odom, 870
F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Tolliver v. Odom, 493 U.S. 855 (1989); In re
Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978).
153. Venner v. Maryland, 3354 A. 2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (stating in dicta
that appellant has a property right in his feces).
154. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the wording of
defendant's cryopreservation agreement with the plaintiffs clearly recognized the plaintiffs prop-
erty rights in the preembryo); Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588, 1978 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14450, at *2, 11 (S.D.N.Y. November 9, 1978) (instructing a jury that the contents
of a test tube used in an in vitro fertilization procedure were personal property able to be con-
verted).
155. Hecht v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles (KANE), 20 Cal. Reptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding that fifteen vials of sperm deposited in a sperm bank were part of the dece-
dent's estate because Kane, the depositor, had an intent to control the sperm after deposit).
156. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1989).
157. Id. at480.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 481.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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However, at Dr. Golde's first appointment with Moore, he real-
ized that Moore's body was overproducing usually rare lymphokines,
important parts of the human immune system.'63 Dr. Golde hoped to
use Moore's cells to produce large quantities of lymphokines.'64
Toward this end, before Moore's surgery, Dr. Golde and another
defendant, Shirley Quan, a researcher employed by the Regents, made
arrangements to have portions of Moore's spleen retained for research
purposes. 65
Dr. Golde used the spleen tissue and the samples collected at
Moore's subsequent medical visits to produce a culture of lymphokine
cells that were enabled to reproduce themselves indefinitely. 6 6 Dr.
Golde and Quan, hoping to capitalize on the commercial potential of
the cell line, entered into a number of contracts with several pharma-
ceutical companies and the University of California to commercially
develop the cell line. 67 These contracts resulted in Dr. Golde receiv-
ing a large number of shares of one of the companies and both Dr.
Golde and the university were paid large sums of money. Finally, Dr.
Golde and Quan were issued a patent on the cell line. 16  They
assigned the patent to the university. 169
Upon learning of the activities of Dr. Golde, Moore brought
suit"' claiming that Dr. Gold, Quan, the University, and the pharma-
ceutical companies had converted his cell line and that he was entitled
to the profits.17 ' The superior court rejected Moore's claim on a pre-
liminary motion.'72 The court of appeal reversed, finding that Moore
retained a proprietary interest in his cells and was thus entitled to
monetary compensation for conversion if he could prove his claims at
trial.' The California Supreme Court found that Moore did not have
a proprietary interest in his cells but that he was entitled to compensa-
tion only if he could prove that Dr. Golde had breached his fiduciary
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 482 n.3.
167. Id. at 482.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Moore stated thirteen causes of action: (1) conversion, (2) lack of informed consent,
(3) breach of fiduciary duty, (4) fraud and deceit, (5) unjust enrichment, (6) quasi-contract, (7)
bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (8) intentional infliction
of emotional distress, (9) negligent misrepresentation, (10) intentional interference with prospec-
tive advantageous economic relationships, (11) slander of title, (12) accounting, and (13)
declaratory relief. Id. at 482 n.4.
171. Id. at 482.
172. Id.
173. Seeid.at483.
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obligations by failing to inform Moore of his commercial interest in
Moore's cells."'
The Moore court expressed four separate understandings of the
relationship between the human body and property law in its majority
and dissenting opinions. The majority feared that granting Moore a
property right in his own tissues would impede future research and
development by pharmaceutical companies using human cells. 7 '
Medical researchers would be hesitant to use previously collected tis-
sue samples because of uncertainty over whether the donor properly
gave consent to the use of the sample for research and commercial
development.
The court relied on a 1987 report of the U.S. Congress Office of
Technology Assessment asserting that biotechnology and pharmaceu-
tical companies would be unlikely to invest in new products without
certainty that title to the human material was clear." 6 The court rea-
soned that a decision to recognize Moore's property right in his own
tissues would thwart the commercial trade in these tissues. 77
Conversely, the court concluded that trade would benefit by
granting property rights in human tissues to researchers and pharma-
ceutical companies who are developing new drugs for the commu-
nity.178  However, although the majority rejected Moore's property
claims, it did reinforce Moore's right to be autonomous in making
medical decisions by extending the law of informed consent to require
Dr. Golde to inform his other patients of any commercial interest he
had in Moore's tissues. 179
Justice Arabian's concurrence emphasized that Moore's claim
involved moral values as well as market effects.' Moore asked the
court to recognize his right to sell his tissues for profit.' However,
for Justice Arabian, equating the human body with commercial com-
modities involved a complex balancing of moral and economic values
that lay beyond property law, tort law, and the abilities of the court. 2
Like the majority, Justice Arabian believed that the proper forum for
deciding mixed issues of morals and economics was the legislature. 3
174. Seeid. at497.
175. Id. at 495-96.
176. Id. at 496.
177. Id. at 495-96.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 485-86.
180. Id. at 497.
181. Id.
182. Seeid. at 498.
183. Id.
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Justice Broussard's minority opinion argued that the Court could
recognize Moore's property right in his own bodily tissue without
negatively impacting the research and development of new pharma-
ceutical products."8 4 Broussard reasoned that a patient possesses a
property right in his or her tissue prior to removal.'85 As a result, a
physician who removes tissues knowing of their commercial value but
neglects to inform the patient of the value must turn over any realized
profits to the patient.186
Furthermore, Justice Broussard stated that the economically val-
uable part of a pharmaceutical product was derived from the work of
the researcher and not the material itself.187 Therefore, pharmaceutical
companies are unlikely to face large damage awards and the
development of new pharmaceutical lines is unlikely to be thwarted.'88
Finally, Justice Mosk's dissent rejected the majority's contention
that courts should grant property rights based solely on market con-
siderations. Rather, Justice Mosk posited that courts should base their
decisions on a system of values that are without a market price.'89 If
the court's property analysis neglects to consider noneconomic values,
then the court's decision will be devoid of equity and morality. 9 ° As a
result, Justice Mosk argued that a patient should be granted a property
right in his or her bodily tissues in order to allow the patient to main-
tain control over his or her body and preserve human dignity.'9 '
3. Natural Rights Theory and Informed Consent
Property Justifications
Courts justify property rights by employing a number of theo-
ries.'92 Under a natural rights theory of property justification, a per-
son's property interest in his or her genetic information is necessary to
experience a sense of personal identity.'93 Furthermore, a person's
184. Id. at 504.
185. Id. at 501.
186. Id. at 502.
187. Id. at 505.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 516.
190. Id. at 516-17.
191. Id. at 517.
192. Discussion in this Comment is limited to three prominent theories of justification:
natural rights theory, labor theory, and social utility theory.
193. Recall that in Moore, Justice Mosk believed that every person has a legally protectable
property interest in his own body because society respected the body as an expression of an indi-
vidual's unique human persona. 793 P.2d at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See Vanhorne's Lessee
v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795) (property expresses the desires of man; the security of
property induces men to unite in society).
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individuality requires that the person be in control of his or her self-
expression.
The doctrine of informed consent is based on a person's right of
self-determination. Because a person has a property right in his or her
person, a person seeking medical care or taking part in a medical
research project owns the right to determine how his or her body will
be used.' 94 The clinical physician or the researcher has the correlative
duty to not act in a manner contrary to the person's informed deci-
sion.' 95 The clinical physician or the researcher protects the person's
right in his or her genetic property by disclosing the risks and benefits
associated with the procedures in question and obtaining the person's
consent before acting.196
4. Natural Rights Theory and the Right to Privacy
Property Justifications
The right to privacy theory also justifies a person's property
interest in his or her genetic information.197 A right of privacy pro-
tects against intrusions against a person's property. Courts have
protected an individual's identity interest when a party appropriated
the individual's voice without permission. 9 8  Thus, a court should
recognize a right of privacy against unwelcome intrusions into a per-
son's genetic material because attributes, like a person's voice, are
expressions of the person's identity. 9'
5. Labor Theory and Property Justification
The labor theory of property holds that a person owns that which
he or she creates or earns through his or her own labor. °0 However,
genetic material is not the result of the efforts of the body. Rather,
genetic material predates the body and, in fact, makes the body what it
is.2"' But labor theory is more than just the efforts of the body in
labor. Labor theory is based on the natural rights notion of individu-
ality.2" 2 Thus, property is an extension of a person's individuality to
194. Barrad, supra note 147, at 1063.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1063-64.
197. A right to privacy theory may also be referred to as a "right to be left alone" theory.
198. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nor.
Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514
(1992).
199. Barrad, supra note 147, at 1070.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1071.
202. Id.
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the products of his or her labor. 23 Hence, under labor theory, genetic
material is justified as property of the body.
Interestingly, courts may employ a labor theory of property when
considering issues surrounding the patenting of living organisms.
Consider that a discovery can be patented if it is useful, novel, and
nonobvious.204 In general, courts also value inventions in terms of
their economic value.205 However, one line of analysis that courts use
to evaluate whether to grant patent rights to biological organisms,
known as phenomenon of nature analysis, is not based on economic
grounds. °6
The United States Supreme Court defined phenomena of nature
goods as those with qualities that "are the work of nature. ' 27 The
Funk Brothers Court found that the qualities of six individual strains
of bacteria were the product of nature.08 Furthermore, the Court
ruled that when the six strains of bacteria were mixed together to
inoculate a crop of leguminous plants, none of the individual bacteria
acquired a new or different use. 29 Because the uses of the bacteria did
not change from their original natural use, the Court concluded that
the mixture of bacteria was nothing more than a phenomenon of
nature, and no invention existed.210
However, the noneconomic foundation of the phenomena of
nature analysis in Funk Brothers was discarded thirty-two years later in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.21' The Chakrabarty decision involved the
genetic engineering of a new form of bacteria that digests oil spills. 21
2
No naturally occurring bacteria possessed this capability.213  The
Court held that Chakrabarty, the microbiologist who engineered the
new bacteria, was entitled to a patent.214 The Court's holding repre-
sents a reformulation of the phenomena of nature argument set forth
in Funk Brothers. In Chakrabarty, the Court distinguished patentable
goods from phenomena of nature by the fact that patentable goods are
the product of human intervention.
203. Id.
204. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988).
205. E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 78 (1996).
206. Id. at 68.
207. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
208. Id. at 131.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
212. Id. at 305.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 310.
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In the context of the Chakrabarty decision, the California
Supreme Court's decision in Moore to not extend a property right to
Moore in the tissue of his removed spleen is more easily understood.
Under Chakrabarty, a person would have a property right in his or her
biological material only if the material is the product of human inter-
vention. Thus, Moore would have a recognizable property right in the
tissue of his spleen only. He would not have a recognized property
right in the cell line based on the tissue of his spleen because the cell
line was not the product of his human ingenuity.
6. Social Utility Theory and Property Justification
Social utility theory justifies the protection of property because
society benefits from putting underutilized resources to an efficient
use.215 Traditional utility theory balances intrusions according to ele-
ments of free will so as to maximize social welfare.216 However, the
freedom of the balancing test of social utility makes predicting out-
comes difficult.
For example, one type of utilitarian theory would embrace an
individual's interests in controlling his or her genetic material and pri-
vacy interests in guarding against release of genetic information to
third parties. Another utilitarian theory would emphasize the interests
of employers and insurers in accessing genetic information on inherit-
able diseases and the interests of society in maintaining public health.
Without knowing the particular utilitarian bent of the court, it is
impossible to predict the extent to which a property interest in genetic
material will be protected under social utility theory. Depending on a
court's specific property rights justification, a person may or may not
have recognized property rights in their own genetic material. This
ultimately affects whether there is a duty to disclose.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DISCLOSURE CLAIMS BASED IN TORT,
CONTRACT, AND PROPERTY
Courts have not addressed whether medical researchers have a
duty to disclose the results of genetic tests conducted during their
research protocols to either research subjects or a third party. Whe-
ther a court finds a medical researcher has an affirmative duty to dis-
close will depend on whether the claim is based in tort, contract, or
property.
215. See Barrad, supra note 147, at 1072.
216. See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691 (1938).
1999]
Seattle University Law Review
It is likely that a court will find an affirmative duty to disclose
genetic test results when the medical researcher is a physician and the
test results are directly related to the condition being studied. Because
the medical researcher is a physician, a court would probably find that
the relationship between physician, medical researcher, and research
subject is special, and is an exception to the general common law rule
of that no duty is owed to another. A plaintiff research subject
asserting a claim for breach of duty to disclose in tort should empha-
size his or her dependence on the researcher based on the researcher's
specialized knowledge. The fiduciary duties associated with this
dependence would further support a court's finding of an affirmative
duty to disclose. However, this duty may be limited when the test
results are inconclusive, no reliable treatment for the condition exists,
or if the research samples tested were anonymized, because each of
these situations weakens the plaintiffs assertion that the researcher has
superior knowledge and the subject is dependent on the researcher's
superior knowledge.
Looking back to the original hypothetical, for example, suppose
Geneticist Roe and the team of epidemiologists approach Dr. Doe to
join their research team. The research protocol proposes to have Dr.
Doe administer the genetic breast cancer test to each of her patients
prior to any surgical intervention. Because Dr. Doe is a physician and
responsible for the clinical care of each of her patients, Dr. Doe is
excepted from the common law rule of no duty owed to another. Each
of Dr. Doe's patients is dependent on Dr. Doe's skill and knowledge
as a physician. As a result, Dr. Doe would owe her patients a fiduci-
ary duty that requires her to fully disclose the benefits and risks of the
care she proposes to undertake as well as the results of all tests she
performs. However, Dr. Doe's duty may be limited by the court if the
genetic test results and the biopsy pathology results are inconclusive.
The analysis is different for the nonphysician medical researcher
despite the fact that nonphysician medical researchers possess a spe-
cialized knowledge far different from their research subjects.
Although the trend in court rulings is to expand the list of recognized
special relationships to include relationships of either unilateral or
mutual dependence, the research protocol for a nonphysician medical
researcher rarely involves a relationship of dependence, because the
structure of medical research is very different from medical care
received in the clinical setting.
Often medical researchers are not physicians. Thus, no physi-
cian-patient relationship exists between the researchers and the
research subject. Also, federal informed consent guidelines designed
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to protect the privacy and welfare of research subjects often are appli-
cable and contract around any disclosure duty that may be present
from the relationship of care between the researcher and the research
subject. Lastly, the samples used in research studies are often anony-
mized, making it impossible for the researcher to offer the subject any
follow-up disclosure.
Neither Geneticist Roe nor any member of the team of epidemi-
ologists is a physician. In contrast to Dr. Doe, neither Geneticist Roe
nor any member of the team of epidemiologists has a fiduciary rela-
tionship with the research subject or a duty to obtain the research
subject's informed consent to the medical procedure. If the Roe
research team is to be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty or for per-
forming medical procedures without informed consent, it could only
be on the basis of Dr. Doe's acts and a theory of secondary liability,
like respondeat superior.217 Additionally, the Roe research team may
be liable under a contract-based claim of performing research without
informed consent. Finally, because the proposed research protocol
does not anonymize the tissue samples, the Roe research team would
not be excepted from providing the research subjects follow-up disclo-
sure.
Thus, to limit liability for failure to disclose research genetic test
results, the Roe research team must inform research subjects as to
what type of information the subject can expect to receive from the
researcher. In addition, the informed consent should delineate the cir-
cumstances in which the researcher will or will not disclose research
findings to research subjects. The research subject must also be given
an opportunity to refuse to be recontacted by the research team.
However, if the Roe research protocol involves the use of anonymous
samples, recontacting the research subject after participation in the
study is impossible, and the informed consent document should
clearly state that, because the samples are anonymous, the researchers
are unable to link the test results to the individual study participants.
The informed consent document should also recognize that some
research subjects may want to limit the use of their tissue samples to
studies of breast cancer or some other disease. In this case, the
research team must clarify in the informed consent document whether
the subject's tissue samples or genetic test results will be shared with
other researchers.
If a court recognizes property as the basis of the plaintiffs claim,
then whether the court finds an affirmative duty to disclose test results
in the medical research setting will depend on which theory of justifi-
217. Cf. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1989).
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cation the court adopts to protect the property interests. Under a
natural rights theory of property justification, a researcher protects a
research subject's ability to control how his or her body will be used
by ensuring informed consent prior to undertaking the research proto-
col. By disclosing the risks and benefits associated with the research
protocol, the researcher protects the research subject's property right
in his or her genetic material.
However, typically the informed consent document is prepared
by the researcher prior to contacting the research subject. Thus, Dr.
Doe and the Roe research team have the ability to contract around the
duty to disclose prior to the research subject participating in the
research protocol. By including a provision in the informed consent
document that expressly waives the researcher's duty to disclose, Dr.
Doe and the Roe research team have the ability to control their expo-
sure to liability.
Alternatively, Dr. Doe and the Roe research team could include
a clause in the informed consent document that makes the transfer of
the tissue sample an inter vivos gift.2"8 When a research subject deliv-
218. An inter vivos gift is an absolute transfer of property between the living without con-
sideration. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (5th ed. 1979). See Karen Gottleib, Human Biolog-
ical Samples and the Laws of Property: The Trust as a Model for Biological Repositories, in
STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 182 (Rob-
ert F. Weir ed., 1998), for a comparison of four types of property transfer of biological samples:
abandonment, bailment, gifting, and the trust. Gottleib contends that a charitable trust is an
ideal form of property transfer of biological samples, because the researcher trustee's fiduciary
duty requires the researcher to act in the best interest of the beneficiary, the general population.
Id. at 195-6. Thus, the structure of a charitable trust operates to protect the donor research sub-
ject's tissue sample as property in the trust, and ensures that the tissue samples, or trust res, is
available for researchers to manipulate for the benefit of the beneficiary. Id. at 192-96. How-
ever, a charitable trust model is only a useful model for nonprofit entities. Id. at 192-93. As a
result, a trust model of property transfer is not an option for medical researchers conducting their
research while under the employ of a for-profit hospital, pharmaceutical company, or research
organization. In contrast, an inter vivos gift model of property transfer for tissue samples is a
viable model for medical researchers operating in all types of research settings. Cf. UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) (laying out the procedures necessary for making anatomical
gifts and requiring that the intentions of the donor be followed, the Act has been adopted by all
fifty states and the District of Columbia); see also CHARLOTTE L. LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY
AND THE LAW: LEGAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 59-63
(1983). Here, the research subject interested in donating his or her tissue samples to a research
protocol would complete a Tissue Donor Card. A sample Tissue Donor Card might look like
the following:
Tissue Donor Card
Of
print or type name of donor
In the hope that I may help others and further medical knowledge, I hereby make this
tissue gift, if medically acceptable, to take effect on __ (date). The words and
marks below indicate my desires.
I give: (a) - any needed tissue sample
(b) - only the following tissue sample
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ers his or her tissue sample to a medical researcher as a gift, the
research subject is divested of dominion and control of the tissue
sample and, therefore, his or her property interest in that tissue sam-
ple. As a result, if Ms. Jones gifted her tissue sample to Dr. Doe and
the Roe research team, no affirmative duty to disclose genetic test
results incident to the research protocol would extend to the medical
researchers, as the property right in Ms. Jones' tissue sample would
transfer from Ms. Jones to the researchers at the time the gift is made.
Under a labor theory of property justification, Dr. Doe, Geneti-
cist Roe, and the epidemiologists would have a recognized property
right in the tissue samples used in the research protocol only if the
research protocol changes the nature of the tissue samples. However,
in the current hypothetical, the proposed research protocol does
nothing to change the nature of the sample being tested. Rather, part
of the research sample is tested to see if the subject is at an increased
risk for breast cancer. As a result, the tissue sample is nothing more
than a phenomenon of nature. Thus, neither the research subject nor
the medical researchers can assert a property right in the tissue sam-
ple, and whether the medical researchers had an affirmative duty to
disclose genetic test results would depend on the nature of the rela-
tionship between the researchers and Ms. Jones and the content of the
informed consent document relating to the collection of the tissue
sample in question. However, if the research protocol were to alter the
nature of the tissue sample removed from the research subject, then
the court may recognize that medical researchers have a property right
in the altered tissue sample and, thus, no duty to disclose genetic test
results. The research subject would have no property right in the
altered tissue sample, as it was not the research subject's labor that
changed the nature of the sample.
Specify the tissue sample(s) for the purposes of medical research or education.
Limitations or special wishes if any:
Signed by the donor and the following two witnesses in the presence of each other:
Signature of Donor
Date of Birth of Donor
Date Signed
City and State
Witness
Witness
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Under one type of social utility theory of property protection,
society must benefit from putting under-utilized resources to an effi-
cient use. Recall that the Moore Court reasoned that if it recognized a
property interest for Mr. Moore in his own biological tissue, then the
economic incentive to conduct medical research would be destroyed.219
In Moore, the medical researcher's use of Mr. Moore's cells was
deemed to be more economically efficient than Mr. Moore's own use
of his cells. As a result, the court recognized that only medical
researchers had a property interest in the cell line developed from Mr.
Moore's tissues.
The medical researchers in the proposed hypothetical are
attempting to validate a newly developed genetic test for an increased
risk of breast cancer. This research protocol is likely to positively
impact the economic basis of the health care industry. Therefore,
under this type of social utility theory of property justification, the use
by the Roe research team and Dr. Doe of Ms. Jones' tissue sample is
more efficient than the use by Ms. Jones of the same sample, thereby
giving the Roe research team and Dr. Doe, not Ms. Jones, a property
right in Ms. Jones' tissue sample and no affirmative duty to disclose
genetic test results.
In contrast, an alternative type of social utility theory of property
justification emphasizes noneconomic values inherent in an individ-
ual's interest in controlling his or her genetic material. Under this
theory, the privacy interests of the individual outweigh the economic
interests of society and, therefore, justify guarding against the release
of an individual's genetic information to third parties. Thus, under
this theory, Ms. Jones' noneconomic privacy interests in relation to
her own genetic information are of greater import than Dr. Doe's and
the Roe research team's economic interest in her genetic information.
As a result, Ms. Jones possesses a recognized property right in her
own genetic information, and Dr. Doe and the Roe research team
would be under an affirmative duty to disclose to Ms. Jones the results
of all genetic tests.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment explores the means by which medical researchers
can reduce their liability associated with the disclosure of genetic test
results to research subjects and third parties. Whether a medical
researcher has a disclosure duty depends on whether the plaintiff bases
his or her claim in tort, contract, or property.
219. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495.
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Under tort, liability for breaching a duty to disclose will turn on
whether the court recognizes the medical researcher-research subject
relationship as a special relationship. The important elements for
finding a special relationship include the status of the researcher and
the level of dependence created by the relationship.
The plaintiffs claim can also be based in a tort-contract hybrid
of informed consent. Here, whether a medical researcher has an
affirmative duty to disclose genetic test results will depend on the
scope of the expectation interest of the research subject as defined by
the content of the informed consent document.
A final basis for the plaintiffs claim can be a tort-contract-prop-
erty hybrid. In this instance, a medical researcher is liable for a breach
of the duty to disclose if the court finds the research subject's genetic
information to be a protectable property interest. Whether genetic
information is found to be a protectable property interest will depend
on which theory of property justification the court adopts. If the court
justifies a property interest in a research subject's genetic information
under a natural rights theory grounded in either informed consent or
the right of privacy, then it is probable that the researcher will not be
liable for failure to disclose genetic test results. Similarly, if the court
justifies genetic information as property under a labor theory of prop-
erty, the researcher should not have a duty to disclose. However,
whether the researcher has a disclosure duty under a social utility the-
ory of a genetic information property interest depends on whether the
court chooses to recognize the individual interests of privacy and
autonomy or the social interests in maintaining public health.
In conclusion, medical researchers can reduce their exposure to
disclosure liability in at least five ways: (1) by carefully defining the
nature of the researcher-research subject relationship; (2) by carefully
stating informed consent to fully apprise the research subject of all
risks and benefits of the protocol and the means by which confidenti-
ality will be protected and ensured; (3) by recognizing that the genetic
samples of their research subjects are the property of the research
subject, and including a statement to this effect in the informed con-
sent document; (4) by structuring the informed consent document to
make the transfer of tissue samples from research subject to researcher
a gift inter vivos; and (5) by limiting their use of identifiable samples
so as to make it impossible to have identifiable test result information
that can be disclosed to either the subject or a curious third party.
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